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Algorithmic mechanism design [9; 10] focuses on the design of algorithms that
aim to achieve global objectives in settings in which the \input" is provided by
self-interested strategic players2. This necessitates the design of algorithms that
are incentive-compatible (a.k.a. truthful3) in the sense that players are incentivized
via payments to behave as instructed. The most natural approach to designing
incentive-compatible algorithms is coming up with an algorithm and an explicit
payment scheme that guarantees its incentive-compatibility. However, nding ap-
propriate payments is often a dicult, setting-specic, task, which is mostly achiev-
able for very simple types of algorithms.
A more general approach is the following: Any algorithm that interacts with
selsh players and then outputs an outcome, can be regarded as computing a func-
tion, called a social-choice function, from the players' \input" to some outcome
space. Certain properties of social-choice functions are known to imply their imple-
mentability, that is, the existence of a payment scheme that guarantees incentive-
compatibility. Hence, instead of explicitly dealing with payments, the problem of
designing incentive-compatible algorithms boils down to analyzing the mathemati-
cal properties of the social-choice functions computed by algorithms. This approach
makes sense if these mathematical properties are simple and easy to analyze.
A simple constraint on social choice functions called \weak-monotonicity" has
been shown to characterize the implementability of social choice functions in sev-
eral interesting settings. However, with the exception of very restricted settings
named \single parameter domains" [1], all these characterizations of incentive-
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3Formally, the solution concept we consider is incentive-compatibility in ex-post Nash (in partic-
ular, our results hold for incentive-compatibility in dominant strategies, which is a special case of
this solution concept).
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compatibility are known to apply only to environments in which the private in-
formation of the players is drawn from inherently non-discrete domains, like convex
domains (see [2; 4; 12; 8]). Our work [13] is motivated by the fact that in many
cases the private information of the players is drawn from discrete domains (e.g.,
integers). Implementability in discrete domains is still little understood and has
received but little attention in economic literature [7].
We consider the following standard mechanism design setting: There are n players
1:::n, and a set of outcomes O. Each player i has a private valuation function
vi 2 Vi that assigns a real value to every o 2 O (the higher the value of the outcome
the more desirable it is). A (deterministic) social-choice function is a function that
assigns an outcome o to every v 2 V , where V denotes V1  :::  Vn. Let V j
denote the cartesian product of all Vis but Vj, and let (vi;v i) denote the prole of
valuation functions in which player i's valuation function is vi 2 Vi, and the other
players' valuation functions are as specied by v i 2 V i. Then, f is implementable
i there is a payment function pi such that for every i 2 [n], for every v i 2 V i,
and for every vi;v0
i 2 Vi,
vi(f(vi;v i))   pi(vi;v i)  vi(f(v0
i;v i))   pi(v0
i;v i):
Rochet [11] has shown that any social-choice function is implementable i a
constraint called \cycle monotonicity" holds (see recent application by Lavi and
Swamy [6]). Bikhchandani et al. [2] proposed the simple weak-monotonicity con-
straint: A social-choice function f is said to be weakly-monotone if for every i 2 [n],
for every v i 2 V i, and for every vi;v0
i 2 Vi, such that f(vi;v i) = o1 and
f(v0
i;v i) = o2 it holds that
vi(o1) + v0
i(o2)  vi(o2) + v0
i(o1):
f is said to be strongly-monotone if whenever o1 6= o2 this inequality is strict [5].
It is easy to show that weak monotonicity is always necessary for the implementabil-
ity of a social-choice function but that it is not always sucient.
We start our exploration of incentive-compatibility by focusing on two important
types of discrete domains: Integer grid domains and 0/1 domains [13]. Let V =
V1  :::  Vn be a domain of valuation functions dened over a set of outcomes
O. We can think of every vi 2 Vi as a vector in RjOj specifying a value for every
outcome.
Definition 1. A valuation function domain is an integer grid domain if V =
ZjOj  :::  ZjOj.
That is, an integer grid domain is a domain of valuation functions that can
take any combination of integer values. We exhibit an example (due to Lan Yu)
that shows that in integer grids weak monotonicity is not sucient to guarantee
implementability [13]. In fact, this example can easily be made to hold for any
bounded integer grid. By bounded integer grid, we simply mean the discrete cube
V = f0;1;:::;LgnjOj (for some positive integer L  1). In contrast, we show that
strong monotonicity is sucient to obtain implementability in integer grids.
Definition 2. V = V1:::Vn is a 0/1 domain if V = f0;1gjOj:::f0;1gjOj.
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We show that, as in the case of integer grids, in 0/1 domains weak-monotonicity
is insucient for implementability, but strong-monotonicity is.
Open Question 1. Is strong-monotonicity sucient for implementability in bounded
integer grids?
When does weak monotonicity guarantee implementability in discrete domains?
As we have seen this is not true even in natural discrete settings (like integer grids).
In contrast, we present [13] a family of discrete domains in which weak-monotonicity
suces for implementability, which we term Monge domains. The proof that this
is indeed true for Monge domains takes advantage of the two dimensional version
of submodularity (see [3]) that holds for this kind of domains (expressed by Monge
matrices, hence the name). Monge domains have a simple combinatorial structure
that has many advantages from a mechanism design perspective. We refer the
reader to [13] for more details.
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